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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of
different size, by considering boards’ costly monitoring of CEOs who have private
information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model
into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assor-
tative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs
when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms’ produc-
tion technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for
large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs,
which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using
samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compen-
sation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information
rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher.
Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics
such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be
optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of em-
pirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate
governance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
How are CEOs of different talent allocated across firms of different size? Answer-
ing this question has proven important in a number of applications such as explaining
exponential CEO compensation growth, examining how much CEO talent contributes
to shareholder wealth, and motivating corporate governance regulation (Gabaix and
Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008; Dicks, 2012). Theses applications are based on a common
view that complementarity between CEO talent and firm size lead to positive assor-
tative matching (PAM), which means there exists a positive monotonic relationship
between firm size and CEO talent in equilibrium. However, CEO-firm relationship
is subject to incentive problems. Can these incentive problems affect the allocation
of CEOs across firms? Furthermore, can these incentive problems, incorporated into
the firm-CEO matching market, have other important implications on how CEOs are
compensated and monitored?
Particularly, the strategic interaction between CEOs and boards of directors,
which is an important and realistic consideration, is missing in most of the related
literature on firm-CEO matching market. It’s widely known that CEOs have infor-
mational advantage over boards of directors, who play an important role in hiring,
monitoring, and compensating CEOs. However, how boards serve their duties will
be affected by their information disadvantage, thus their decisions on compensating,
monitoring and hiring CEOs will likely affect how CEOs match with firms. If so,
positive assortative matching, without a careful consideration, might be an artifact
from oversimplified models which neglect important and realistic economic forces, and
empirical applications relying on PAM can be spurious.
Our paper bridges the gap by integrating information friction and board moni-
toring in a matching market with CEOs of different talent and firms of different size.
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There is a board in each firm hiring, monitoring, and compensating the CEO. There
are two stages in our model. In the first stage, the board in each firm simultaneously
decides which CEO to hire. Firms’ size and CEOs’ talent are observable. In the
second stage, output will be realized as a product of firm size and CEO talent with
some probability and zero otherwise. The realization of firm output is only known to
the CEO who reports it to the board and the board audits the CEO’s report at a cost.
The board maximizes her expected utility by setting auditing probability and CEO
compensation to incentivize the CEO for truthful reporting. The board’s expected
utility is tied to firm profit after paying CEO compensation and the board suffers
disutility from monitoring the CEO due to lack of independence. Corporate gover-
nance in each firm is defined as the probability of the board’s auditing the CEO’s
report.
In sharp contrast to previous literature on how CEOs match with firms, we show
that despite of the complementarity between firm size and CEO talent, positive as-
sortative matching can break down when marginal cost of monitoring is high enough.
The intuition for the failure of PAM is as follows. Every board prefers a more tal-
ented CEO. The board in a larger firm has both advantage and disadvantage to
compete against the board in a smaller firm for valuable CEO talent. A larger firm
generates higher marginal product from the CEO’s talent due to complementary pro-
duction technology, thus it tends to outbid the smaller firm for the high talent CEO.
However, the board in a larger firm suffers from a higher disutility from the need
to monitor the CEO more intensively because there are more resources at a larger
firm for the CEO to appropriate. Monitoring is costly, thus the board at a larger
firm underbids because of a larger monitoring cost. The disadvantage increases with
marginal cost of monitoring. When marginal cost of monitoring is high enough, the
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disadvantage dominates advantage, positive assortative matching will fail and a more
talented CEO match with a smaller firm.
The above result is important from at least two aspects. First, it provides us a
robustness check on the validity of using PAM as the equilibrium sorting pattern,
which is widely used in empirical applications. When modeling the CEO labor mar-
ket, it’s not suitable to take as granted that there is PAM between firm size and CEO
talent. 1 Second, our result explains why CEO turnover can be affected by industry
shock, which is a seemingly puzzling empirical finding contradicting with a common
belief that market-level shock should be filtered out in the decision of retaining and
firing CEOs. This is explained by our finding that, besides marginal cost of monitor-
ing, sorting pattern can also be affected by market-level profitability. And a change
in sorting pattern can be considered as CEO turnover and a change in market-level
profitability can be considered as industry shock, our result thus explains why CEO
turnover is connected to industry shock.
More importantly, we show that as PAM fails, it will fail first for smaller firms and
lower talent CEOs. It can be true that there is PAM in top firms and CEOs, but PAM
fails for bottom firms and CEOs. This implies that empirical applications relying on
PAM are more robust with a subsample of large firms compared to a subsample of
small firms. Thus a full sample will not necessarily be more robust than the sample
excluding smaller firms.
We have two novel findings on CEO compensation. First, CEO compensation is
always increasing in CEO talent irrespective the size of firms that CEOs match with.
Thus our result shows that the fundamental determinant of CEO compensation is
CEO talent instead of firm size they match with. Empirical results on the significant
1This is understandable because firms are heterogeneous in many dimensions, then heterogeneity
other than size might distort PAM between size and talent. However, our paper shows that even
firms and CEOs are only different in a single dimension (i.e., size and talent), PAM can still fail.
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positive correlation between firm size and CEO compensation can be reconciled if
there is significant positive correlation between firm size and CEO talent. Second,
under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into two
components. The first component is explained by competitive market pay, and the
second component is explained by rent extraction because CEOs extract information
rent from their informational advantage over boards of directors. The information
rent increases with CEO talent, thus, in our model, wage spread between different
CEOs is larger than wage spread obtained from models without information frictions.
When marginal cost of monitoring is lower, CEOs’ information rent will be lower
which results in lower CEO compensation as well as stronger corporate governance.
We discuss firm-level corporate governance by assuming a specific sorting pat-
tern between firm size and CEO talent. In contrast to most related literature, our
discussion applies to any sorting pattern besides positive assortative matching. The
main result is that firm-level corporate governance is affected by aggregate market
characteristics such as the scarcity of CEO talent and how CEOs match with firms.
Cross-sectionally, larger firms have weaker governance than smaller firms when high-
talent CEOs are scarce enough or larger firms match with sufficiently talented CEOs.
The intuition is as follows. When talented CEOs are sufficiently scarce or larger firms
try to match with sufficiently talented CEOs, competition between firms will be more
intensive. Thus it’s not enough for larger firms to merely use their size advantage
to attract more talented CEOs even though larger size gives a CEO higher marginal
product. A firm with larger size has to set a lower corporate governance to attract
valuable CEO talent. The result on corporate governance shows that weak corporate
governance can arise from the competition for CEO talent instead of board’s failure
in monitoring the CEO.
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By connecting marginal cost of monitoring to board characteristics such as boards’
independence, ownership, and reputational concerns, our model suggests a number
of empirical predictions. First, pay-performance sensitivity, CEO pay and corporate
governance are substitutes, thus higher corporate governance will result in a lower
pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay. Second, PAM between firm size and CEO
talent is more likely to fail (1.) for an industry with lower boards’ independence,
boards’ ownership or reputational concerns (2.) in economic downturn, (3.) for
smaller firms and lower talent CEOs. Third, (1.) monotonicity between CEO com-
pensation and CEO talent is stronger than that between CEO compensation and firm
size, (2.) under PAM, wage spread increases with firm size, and CEO compensation
is higher for an industry with lower boards’ independence, boards’ ownership or rep-
utational concerns. Forth, under PAM, (1.) when there is a scarcity of CEO talent
(large firms), larger firms have weaker (stronger) corporate governance than smaller
firms, (2.) corporate governance is weaker at economic downturns.
To our best knowledge, Edmans and Gabaix (2011) is the only paper discussing
the distortion of talent allocation and its implication on economic efficiency. Firms in
Edmans and Gabaix (2011) differ in multidimensional types (size, riskiness and CEO’s
cost of effort), which are cleverly transformed into a single type of “effective firm size”.
They find PAM between firm size and CEO talent can fail after taking moral hazard
into consideration and there is efficiency loss associated with such failure. However,
in their model, PAM is always the equilibrium sorting pattern between effective firm
size and CEO talent. Compared with our paper where the failure of PAM is driven
by the absolute level of model parameters, sorting pattern in Edmans and Gabaix
(2011) is driven by their magnitude compared with other firms instead of the absolute
level. Acharya et al. (2012) examine how corporate governance and competition will
affect firms’ ability to attract better CEOs. They find firms with weaker corporate
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governance will match with better CEOs both theoretically and empirically. In their
model, firms have the same size ex ante and the role of board of directors is not
considered.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 solves the model and presents equilibrium
sorting condition. Section 3 discusses CEO compensation and monitoring of CEOs.
Section 4 considers extensions when firms have different marginal cost of monitoring.
Section 5 discusses implications and empirical predictions. Section 6 concludes.
2 A MODEL of ALLOCATING CEOS
There are a measure 1 of firms and CEOs in the market and each firm has a board
of directors. Denote the distribution functions of firm size as F and CEO talent as
G. A firm with size s is indexed by i = F (s). Denote si as the size of the firm which
has index i and naturally i = F (si). Similarly, we can define aj as the CEO’s talent
who has index j among all CEOs. We may refer the firm with index i as firm i, the
board at firm i as board i, and the CEO with index j as CEO j. We will not discuss
the incentive problems between firms and boards, thus board can be considered as
firm in our model, and we will use board and firm interchangeably. We assume both
distribution functions are atomless, thus si and aj are both strictly increasing in
indexes i 2 [0, 1] and j 2 [0, 1] respectively, thus we will call indexes i, j as ranks. We
also assume si and aj are continuously differentiable.
There are two stages in our model. In the first stage, boards hire CEOs simulta-
neously from the CEO labor market. In the second stage, each firm’s output will be
realized, which will be divided between the board and the CEO within the firm, thus
here the board fully aligns her interest with shareholders. We call the first stage as the
matching stage and the second stage as the production stage. Formally, a matching
is a one to one mapping M : [0, 1] ! [0, 1], where firm i matches with the CEO of
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rank M(i) and CEO j matches with the firm of rank M 1(j). When M mapped i to
j = i, the same ranked firms and CEOs match with each other, we call this sorting
pattern as positive assortative matching (PAM), which will play an important role in
our discussion.
To define equilibrium, we first define stable matching. Intuitively, if no board and
CEO will be strictly better off by breaking current match and forming a new pair
or prefer to stay unmatched, then the matching is stable. Note here the notion of
stability requires both sides to have no incentives to deviate. Clearly, whether the
matching is stable is related to boards’ utility and CEOs’ wage from such matching.
We assume boards and CEOs receive zero payoff if unmatched. In equilibrium, board’s
utility only depends on firm rank and CEO wage only depends on CEO rank, given
distributions of firm size and CEO talent. Denote board utility function as u : [0, 1]!
R+ and CEO wage as v : [0, 1] ! R+. An equilibrium consists of a matching M :
[0, 1]! [0, 1] and payoffs u : [0, 1]! R+ and v : [0, 1]! R+ which satisfy:
(i) 8j 2 [0, 1], i = M(j), (ui, vj) is feasible
(ii) the matching is stable
We will start with the production stage and solve the utility frontier of a matched
pair of board and CEO by solving a standard costly state verification problem. We
will use the utility frontier to solve the equilibrium sorting pattern in the first stage
and show how the change in sorting pattern is driven by the the optimal contract in
the production stage.
2.1 Production Stage
We describe the production stage in which a board and a CEO engage in upon
matching. Technically, we solve a costly state verification model to characterize the
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optimal contract and Pareto frontier of a matched pair, which will be used to solve
the first stage equilibrium sorting pattern.
The firm’s size is s and the CEO’s talent is a, both s and a are observable. There
are two states of the world, denoted as {H,L}. With probability p, state H realizes
and the output is sa; with probability 1 p, state L realizes and the output is 0. Thus p
measures the profitability of firm production. The expected output is thus psa, which
is complementary in firm size and CEO talent by noting that the marginal product
of CEO talent is increasing in firm size. The complementarity in firm’s technology
is a natural assumption, considering that in a larger firm, the impact of CEO talent
will be larger and thus marginal product of CEO talent will be higher.
The true output is only observable to the CEO, though the distribution is known to
both the board and the CEO. Upon observing the output, the CEO submits a report
r 2 {H,L} to the board who then decides a probability gr to audit the CEO’s report,
which is called the probability of monitoring. We assume once the board decides to
audit the report, she will know the output for sure by paying total monitoring cost
kgr, where k   0 is the marginal cost of monitoring.
Throughout the paper, we assume k < ps0a01 p , where s0 and a0 are size and talent for
the firm and CEO with rank 0 (i.e., the smallest firm and the CEO with the lowest
talent). We will show that this assumption is sufficient to guarantee all boards’
participation constraint can be satisfied. We also assume all boards in different firms
have the same k. There are two reasons for this assumption. The first reason is,
in this paper, we focus on how magnitude of k instead of heterogeneity of k would
affect equilibrium sorting and equilibrium payoffs. Adding heterogeneity in k will
add another factor to affect sorting pattern which is not the focus of this paper
and complicates economic intuition. The second reason is purely technical. Firms
will have two-dimensional types (s, k) if boards have different ks and firms have
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different size. Since our model cannot be simplified by combining (s, k) into a single
dimensional type (e.g., Edmans and Gabaix, 2011), we will run into the complicated
problem of solving multidimensional matching, on which little is known.
Monitoring the CEO can be costly to the board for various reasons. The cost can
be considered as the disutility from effort aversion because the board needs to put
effort into auditing the report. In the case of hiring an external auditor to audit the
report, the cost can be considered as auditing fee paid to the auditor. The cost can also
be considered as board’s distaste of monitoring the CEO because of the board’s lack
of independence. As suggested by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), a board’s careers
are tied to the CEO and the board suffers from disutility when directors oppose
the CEO. In this paper, we will focus on the third explanation and consider how
the marginal cost of monitoring is affected by various board characteristics including
board independence.
The CEO is paid with a wage of wr when there is no auditing and wor when
there is auditing, where o 2 {H,L} refers to true state of the world. When there is
no auditing, wage will be paid according to the CEO’s report r and when there is
auditing, true output will be known to the board, thus wage will be paid according
to the CEO’s report r and true output o. When o = r, the CEO reports truthfully
and when o 6= r, the CEO falsifies a report. According to revelation principle, we will
look for truth-telling equilibrium in which the CEO reports truthfully. Apparently,
the contract consists of {wr, wor, gr}, r 2 {H,L}. From now one, denote
C = {wL, wLL, wLH , wH , wHH , wHL, gL, gH}
as the optimal contract.
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In truth-telling equilibrium, the CEO’s incentive compatibility has to be satisfied.
In stateH, if the CEO falsifies a report of L, she gets wL+sa 0 with probability 1 gL
and wHL with probability gL; instead, if the CEO reports truthfully, she gets wH with
probability 1   gH and wHH with probability gH . When the CEO falsifies a report,
she pockets the difference between actual output and reported output. The incentive
compatibility under state H requires the CEO prefers reporting H to falsifying a
report of L. By the same token, incentive compatibility requires that the CEO reports
L other than H under state L. The CEO’s incentive compatibility conditions are:
(1  gH)wH + gHwHH   (1  gL)(wL + sa  0) + gLwHL
(1  gL)wL + gLwLL   (1  gH)(wH + 0  sa) + gHwLH
Under truth-telling equilibrium, denote expected CEO compensation as EW , ex-
pected total monitoring cost as EC, and expected firm output as EO, we have
EW =p((1  gH)wH + gHwHH) + (1  p)((1  gL)wL + gLwLL)
EC =pkgH + (1  p)kgL
EO =psa
The board solves the following problem
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u(s, a, v) = Max
C
EO   EW   EC
s.t. p((1  gH)wH + gHwHH) + (1  p)((1  gL)wL + gLwLL)   v, (PK)
(1  gH)wH + gHwHH   (1  gL)(wL + sa  0) + gLwHL, (ICH)
(1)
(1  gL)wL + gLwLL   (1  gH)(wH + 0  sa) + gHwLH , (ICL)
wL, wLL, wLH , wH , wHH , wHL   0, (LL)
wH , wHH  sa, wL, wLL  0, (FC)
gH , gL 2 [0, 1]
u(s, a, v) is the board’s value function. PK is promise keeping constraint, and v is the
value promised to the CEO by the board in the first stage when the board matches
with the CEO. The CEO is protected by limited liability (LL) which means the CEO
cannot be paid with a strictly negative wage. FC is feasibility constraint, which means
the CEO cannot be paid with a wage higher than the output.
From LL and FC, wL = wLL = 0. We can also have wHL = wLH = 0 as in standard
costly verification model (Border and Sobel, 1987). This is because the board wants
to maximize penalty to reduce total monitoring cost, however, the board cannot
penalize the CEO with a negative wage because of the limited liability constraint,
thus wHL = wLH = 0. By LL, the left hand side of ICL is non-negative and by FC,
the right hand side of ICL is smaller or equal to zero, thus ICL can always be satisfied
from LL and FC, which implies the CEO will not falsify a report if the true state
is L, thus a report of high output must be true. Because monitoring is costly, the
board will not audit the CEO’s report if she reports H, thus gH = 0. By substituting
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wL = wLL = 0, wHL = wLH = 0, and gH = 0, the board’s problem can now be
simplified as:
u(s, a, v) = Max
gL2[0,1],wH
psa  pwH   (1  p)kgL
s.t. pwH   v, (PK)
wH   (1  gL)sa, (ICH)
ICH must be binding, if not, the board can reduce gL and increase her expected
utility, thus gL = 1   wHsa . By substituting gL = 1   wHsa into the above problem, we
have
u(s, a, v) = Max
gL2[0,1]
pgLsa  (1  p)kgL
s.t. p(1  gL)sa   v, (PK)
Note that we have assumed k < ps0a01 p , because s   s0 and a   a0 for all s and a,
then we have k < psa1 p , 8s, a, which implies the board’s expected utility is increasing
in gL. The board will want to set gL as large as possible, thus the promise keeping
constraint must be binding. We will also show that in equilibrium v  psa. The
optimal solution is
gL = 1  v
psa
, wH =
v
p
which shows that expected CEO wage pwH equals to the promised value v and the
probability of monitoring gL = psa vpsa equals to the share of total output obtained by
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the board of directors excluding CEO compensation. Thus monitoring determines
the division of match surplus between the board and the CEO.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract consists of gH = 0, gL = 1   vpsa , wH = vp , wL =
wLL = wLH = wHL = 0
From the optimal contract, gL is increasing in firm size s, which implies the prob-
ability of monitoring is larger at a larger firm, and thus total monitoring cost is
higher at a larger firm. Intuitively, at a larger firm, there are more opportunities
for the CEO to appropriate, thus the board needs to impose higher probability of
monitoring to prevent the CEO from misreporting. gL is a decreasing function of v,
and in equilibrium, the CEO’s expected wage will exactly equal to v, thus a higher
CEO compensation implies a lower probability of monitoring. Intuitively, a higher
compensation and a stronger corporate governance can both incentivize the CEO for
truthful reporting, thus monitoring and compensation can substitute for each other.
However, both are costly to the board, the board will impose a lower probability of
monitoring when paying the CEO a higher compensation to save monitoring cost.
Another noticeable feature of the optimal contract is the probability of monitoring
is independent of k. Mathematically, this is because optimal contract can be pinned
down exactly by the CEO’s incentive constraints, which are independent of how costly
monitoring is. Intuitively, when monitoring becomes less costly, the board will not
increase the probability of monitoring because doing so is not in the interest of the
board as long as monitoring is costly. Similarly, the board will not decrease the
probability of monitoring when monitoring becomes more costly, this is because the
board always prefers to impose a higher probability of monitoring instead of a higher
CEO compensation. However, the independence of the probability of monitoring
with respect to the marginal cost of monitoring k is only true in the production stage
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when we treat v as an exogenously given. In equilibrium, v is a function of k, and
the probability of monitoring will be affected by k through CEO compensation.
By plugging the optimal contract to the board’s objective function, the board’s
value function is
u(s, a, v) = psa  v| {z }
first best
  (1  p)k(1  v
psa
)| {z }
total monitoring cost
(2)
which contains two parts: first best part and total monitoring cost. The first best part
corresponds to a CEO market without monitoring cost and information friction, i.e.,
both the board and the CEO know the firm’s output and auditing the CEO’s report
isn’t needed. It’s easy to show that under the first best case, there will always be
positive assortative matching (PAM). However, with information friction, monitoring
cost might generate a force to distort positive assortative matching between firm size
and CEO talent. Total monitoring cost is increasing in firm size, which implies a
larger firm suffers from a larger loss from matching because of a higher probability of
monitoring in a larger firm.
Technically, in the first best case, we have a transferable utility matching, which
means the exchange rate of payoffs between the board and the CEO is 1:1, and
Becker (1973) shows that when utility is transferable, complementarity in production
technology is sufficient for positive assortative matching. In our model, the board’s
utility function can be written as u(s, a, v) = psa  (1  p)k   [1  (1 p)kpsa ]v, thus the
exchange rate between u and v is 1  (1 p)kpsa : 1, which corresponds to an imperfectly
transferable utility (ITU) matching.2 For ITU matching, Legros and Newman (2007)
2It’s sometimes called non-transferable utility (NTU) by some authors, however, NTU is also
used to refer to matching when transfer is completely prohibited. We think imperfectly transferable
utility matching is a more suitable name.
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shows that complementarity is not sufficient to generate PAM, and thus we will move
to the matching stage to examine how firms match with CEOs with the presence of
monitoring cost.
2.2 Matching Stage
After solving the production stage optimal contract and the board’s value function,
we solve the first stage matching problem. In the first stage, firms match with CEOs
by anticipating the second stage payoffs. We start from a simple two by two case,
which serves the purpose of conveying intuition on the driving forces of how firms
match with CEOs.
2.2.1 A Two by Two Case
We first consider a simple case with two firms and two CEOs. We denote two
firms’ size as s0 and s1 with s0 < s1 and CEOs’ talent as a0 and a1 with a0 < a1.
Clearly, there are only two sorting patterns: “firm 0 matches with CEO 0, firm 1
matches with CEO 1” and “firm 0 matches with CEO 1, firm 1 matches with CEO 0”.
We refer to the first one as PAM and the second one as negative assortative matching
(NAM). Denote the utility for board i 2 {0, 1} to match with CEO j 2 {0, 1} as
u(si, aj, vj) = psiaj   (1  p)k   [1  (1  p)k
psiaj
]vj (3)
If the equilibrium sorting pattern is PAM, then the board in firm 1 prefers to
match with CEO 1 to CEO 0 and the board in firm 0 prefers to match with CEO 0
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to CEO 1, and we have the following inequalities:
u(s1, a1, v1)   u(s1, a0, v0) (4)
u(s0, a0, v0)   u(s0, a1, v1)
It’s easy to understand that above inequalities are also sufficient conditions for PAM.
By the functional form of u(si, aj, vj), which is defined in Equation (3), the above two
inequalities can hold if and only if ps0(a1 a0)
1  (1 p)kps0a1
 v1  ps1(a1 a0)
1  (1 p)kps1a1
, which implies
k  p
1  p
1
1
s0a1
+ 1s1a1
(5)
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for PAM to hold in this two by two
case.
The two by two case shows that in the CEO market with information fiction,
complementarity in firm production is not sufficient to guarantee positive assorta-
tive matching. There is an equilibrium that the large firm matches with the low
talent CEO when monitoring CEO becomes more costly. The intuition relies on the
understanding that size brings both advantage and disadvantage to the firm. The
advantage of the large firm is, it has higher marginal product from CEO talent be-
cause of the complementary production technology. The large firm tends to outbid
the small firm due to higher surplus from matching with the high talent CEO. The
disadvantage of the large firm is: higher probability of monitoring is needed in the
large firm because more stakes on the table for the CEO to appropriate, then the
large firm tends to underbid the smaller firm because higher monitoring cost reduces
matching surplus. As the marginal cost of monitoring k increases, advantage will not
be affected (since it is a result of production technology) and disadvantage increases.
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And when k is large enough, disadvantage outweighs advantage, large firm underbids
small firm, NAM will emerge as the equilibrium sorting pattern.
To be more precise, we can consider a situation where both firms bid for the high
talent CEO. The highest bid is the wage paid to the CEO when the firm is indifferent
from matching with both CEOs. For firm i 2 {0, 1}, denote the maximum bid as bi,
then bi can be solved from u(si, a1, bi)   u(si, a0, 0). We have bi = psi(a1 a0)
1  (1 p)kpsia1
, i 2 {0, 1}.
Then there is PAM if and only if b1   b0. Note that the numerator of bi measures
how much firm output increases when firm i matches with high talent CEO instead of
the low talent one and it’s increasing in firm size. However, the denominator is also
increasing in firm size. Thus size brings both advantage and disadvantage to firm i.
As k increases, denominator decreases, both firms will bid more aggressively for the
high talent CEO. This is because it’s more costly to monitor the CEO and boards
use higher CEO compensation to reduce monitoring cost. However, the large firm
will fail the competition eventually if k continues to grow.
2.2.2 The General Case
The above result from two by two case is easy to be generalized to the market
with a continuum of firms and CEOs. The difference is that in a market with more
than three firms and CEOs, we have more than two sorting patterns, thus failure of
PAM will not imply NAM.3 Instead of a cutoff value for PAM and NAM as in the
two by two case, there exists a cutoff value for PAM and the failure of PAM.
Proposition 2. There is PAM between firm size and CEO talent if and only if k 
ps0a0
2(1 p)
3It’s easy to see that in a market with n firms and n CEOs, there are a total number of n! sorting
patterns. When we have a continuum of firms and CEOs, n!1 and n!!1, thus we have infinite
number of sorting patterns.
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The above proposition shows that in the market with a continuum of firms and
CEOs, when marginal cost of monitoring k is higher than the cutoff value ps0a02(1 p) ,
PAM fails. The intuition carries from the two by two case. When k = ps0a02(1 p) , there
can be other sorting patterns which are not PAM but are pay-off equivalent to PAM
(Legros and Newman, 2007), which means these sorting patterns generate the same
payoffs for boards and CEOs as PAM. The cutoff value ps0a02(1 p) is distribution free and
more specifically, it is not related to size of firms and talent of CEOs other than the
bottom firm and CEO.
Note that PAM requires a perfect positive monotonic relationship between size
and talent for all firms and CEOs, thus it is a fairly strong requirement. However,
we might be able to obtain a finer structure when we consider subsets of firms and
CEOs: it’s possible that when PAM fails, it is still the equilibrium sorting pattern for
a subset of firms and CEOs when it fails for another subset of firms and CEOs. To
proceed, we first define sorting patterns on a subset of firms and CEOs. If PAM is the
equilibrium sorting pattern for firms and CEOs with ranks [m,n] ✓ [0, 1], then we say
there is PAM on [m,n]; if PAM fails for firms and CEOs with ranks [m,n] ✓ [0, 1],
then we say PAM fails on [m,n]. One thing to notice here is that even if PAM fails on
[m,n], there might still exist a subset [↵,  ] ⇢ [m,n] such that there is PAM on the
proper subset [↵,  ] and PAM fails on a non-empty complement subset [m,n]\[↵,  ].
In the proposition below, we show that when PAM fails, for some k, we can find a
cutoff rank such that there is PAM for firms and CEOs above that cutoff rank and
there is a failure of PAM for firms and CEOs below that cutoff rank.
Proposition 3. (PAM on top) For k 2 ( ps0a02(1 p) ,min{ps0a01 p , ps0a12(1 p)}) and i¯ = {i : k =
ps0ai
2(1 p)}, there is PAM on [¯i, 1] and PAM fails on [0, i¯]
The above proposition shows that for given distributions of firms and CEOs, when
k is larger than the cutoff value ps0a02(1 p) , PAM will first fail for smaller firms and lower
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talent CEOs, but PAM is still the equilibrium sorting pattern for larger firms and
more talented CEOs above the cutoff value. However, as k increases, the region for
PAM will shrink as the cutoff value i¯ is an increasing function of k. This result
provides a robustness condition for empirical applications relying on PAM, which will
be discussed in latter sections.
We emphasize here that the above proposition is a sufficient condition for “PAM
on top”. It’s still possible that we can find a subset of firms and CEOs on [0, i¯] such
that there is PAM on that subset. In fact, if the matching function is continuous,
because PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern on [¯i, 1], we can find a ✏ > 0 and
construct such subset as [¯i   ✏, i¯] and there is PAM on [¯i   ✏, i¯] due to continuity.
What we show here is that when PAM fails, it must not fail on [¯i, 1], and must fail
on (a subset of) [0, i¯]. Note that i¯ is unique because CEO talent is strictly increasing
in rank. k < min{ps0a01 p , ps0a12(1 p)} ensures our assumption of k < ps0a01 p can be satisfied
and k < ps0a12(1 p) , thus the solution to i¯ = {i : k = ps0ai2(1 p)} is not empty.
Note that both cutoff values ps0a02(1 p) and i¯ are decreasing in p, thus Propositions
2 and 3 show how sorting pattern is affected by p, which is the probability of “high
output”, a measure of profitability of firm production. Mathematically, the effect from
lowering p on sorting pattern is similar to the effect from increasing k. Intuitively,
when p is small, complementarity is weaker, thus PAM is more likely to fail. To be
more specific, if we fix k and decreases p, PAM will fail for bottom firms and CEOs
first. As p continues to decrease, PAM will fail for more and more bottom firms
and CEOs, and the set of firms and CEOs on which PAM is the equilibrium sorting
pattern will become smaller. We will discuss how this explains why CEO turnover is
connected to industry shock.
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3 COMPENSATING AND MONITORING CEOS
In previous section, we have shown that considering information frictions in CEO
labor market will generate surprising results on the allocation of CEOs: PAM may
not be the equilibrium sorting pattern even with complementary production technol-
ogy and unidimensional matching (firms are only different in size and CEOs are only
different in talent). And in this section, we will show such consideration also gener-
ates novel insights on how CEOs are compensated and monitored. Unlike previous
literature focusing nearly exclusively on PAM, we will also examine how failure of
PAM affects CEO compensation and monitoring of CEOs.
We start with two lemmas. The first lemma shows that once PAM fails, there is
negative assortative matching (NAM) on a subset of firms and CEOs. Note here we
assume the matching function M is continuously differentiable. The second lemma
presents closed form solutions of CEO compensation and the probability of monitor-
ing.
Lemma 1. When PAM fails on [0, 1], there exists a subset of firms (a, b) ✓ [0, 1] with
M
0
(i) < 0, i 2 (a, b).
The proof to the above lemma is very straightforward. Intuitively, if there doesn’t
exist such subset, PAM must be the equilibrium sorting pattern on [0, 1], which
contradicts with the failure of PAM.
In the next lemma, we solve CEO compensation and the probability of monitoring.
Our solution is different from previous literature (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Edmans
et al., 2009; Tervio, 2008; Dicks, 2012) from two aspects: first, our closed-form solution
can be applied to any sorting pattern, not only PAM; second, our solution does not
rely on specific distributions of CEO talent and firm size, this challenges us with
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some tractability issue, however, it also provides us the opportunity to examine how
changes in distributions of talent and size can affect how CEOs are monitored.
Lemma 2. Given sorting pattern M , CEO j’s wage and the probability of monitoring
at firm i are
vj =
ˆ j
0
'(l, j, k,M)psM(l)a
0
ldl
gi = 1  vM(i)
psiaM(i)
where '(l, j, k,M) = exp[  ´ jl
(1 p)k
psM(x)a
2
x
a
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsM(x)ax
dx]/(1  (1 p)kpsM(l)al )
Note that in Section 2.1, the probability of monitoring is independent of marginal
cost of monitoring k. However, CEO compensation is endogenously determined in the
matching market and it is a function of k. From the optimal contract in single firm’s
problem, we know that how intensively to monitor the CEO is affected by how much
to compensate the CEO, thus CEO compensation is affected by the marginal cost k
through CEO compensation, which is clearly shown in gi = 1   vM(i)psiaM(i) . The above
Lemma also highlights the dependence of CEO compensation and the probability of
monitoring on sorting pattern M . The next two sections will show such dependence
in a clearer way.
3.1 Compensating CEOs
A central debate in CEO compensation is whether CEOs are paid higher merely
because they work for larger firms. Previous literature shows that under PAM, higher
talent CEOs match with larger firms, and firm size augments CEO pay, which pushes
CEO compensation higher when firm size increases. However, it’s not clear how
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crucially this result depends on sorting pattern. The following proposition shows
that CEO compensation is increasing in CEO talent in any sorting pattern, and will
not increase in firm size if PAM fails.
Proposition 4. (Reward for talent) Regardless of sorting pattern
i. CEO compensation is strictly increasing in CEO talent
ii. CEOs of the same talent matching with firms of different size have the same
wage
The result above implies that CEO compensation will not increase in firm size if
PAM fails and a CEO will not be paid with a higher wage solely because she works
for a larger firm. The result here seemingly contradicts with the empirical finding
of positive correlation between CEO compensation and firm size. Without actually
testing the sorting pattern of CEO market from available data, this can be reconciled
from two aspects. The first is, PAM is indeed the equilibrium sorting pattern in the
CEO market, thus CEO compensation is an increasing function of firm size because
PAM between firm size and CEO talent implies PAM between firm size and CEO
compensation. The second is, PAM actually fails, however, there is still positive
correlation between CEO compensation and firm size if the failure of PAM is not
too extreme (such as NAM). This is because correlation measures linear relationship,
but the above proposition discusses monotonic relationship, and either will imply the
other. Thus positive correlation between CEO compensation and firm size will not
contradict with the fact that CEO compensation does not increase in firm size.
Overall, Proposition 4 shows that talent will always be rewarded even in a fric-
tional CEO labor market where PAM may fail. In fact, this result is true as long as
boards prefer a high talent CEO to a low talent CEO. To understand this, we assume
there are two CEOs, CEO 0 and CEO 1. If both CEOs have the same talent, then
they must be paid with the same wage, if not, both boards will prefer the one with a
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lower wage, thus the matching cannot be stable. If CEO 1 has strictly higher talent
than CEO 0 but is paid with a weakly lower wage than CEO 0, then the board who
hires CEO 0 will be better off by hiring CEO 1 and paying her CEO 0’s wage. CEO
1 will accept her new job offer because now she is paid with a higher wage. Thus
matching is unstable and a rematch occurs until CEOs with strictly higher talent are
paid with a strictly higher wage.
Previous literature focuses on frictionless CEO labor market without any infor-
mation friction. Denote v¯j as CEO j’s compensation under frictionless CEO market.
In such market, complementary production technology will be sufficient for PAM,
and thus it’s easy to solve CEO j’s wage v¯j =
´ j
0 psla
0
ldl.4 Here v¯j crucially depends
on firm size, however, we will show that CEO compensation will also be affected by
information friction besides firm size in the frictional CEO market with information
frictions and monitoring cost. Instead of discussing CEO compensation under dif-
ferent sorting patterns in frictional CEO market, we restrict our discussion to PAM.
This provides us an opportunity to examine how information fiction affects CEO com-
pensation by holding sorting pattern fixed (PAM). By Lemma 2, we can solve CEO
j’s wage under PAM with information friction vPj by substituting j = M(j).
Proposition 5. Denote vPj and v¯j as CEO j’s compensation under frictional and fric-
tionless CEO markets respectively, under PAM, we have
vPj = v¯j +  j,
vPj
@j
  v¯j
@j
=
 j
@j
with  j =
´ j
0 ['(l, j, PAM)  1]psla
0
ldl > 0 and
@ j
@j > 0 if k 6= 0
4In a frictionless CEO market, board i’s utility function when she hires CEO j is u(si, aj , vj) =
psiaj   vj . Since PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO j matches with firm i = j. Because
hiring CEO j is an optimal choice for board i = j, first order condition yields psja
0
j   v
0
j = 0.
Integrating along CEO’s rank gives out vj =
´ j
0 psla
0
ldl. Note here we assume v0 = 0, i.e., the CEO
with rank 0 gets 0 equilibrium wage.
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 j = vPj   v¯j is the difference between vPj and v¯j to CEO j due to her superior
information, thus we call  j as the information rent to CEO j.  j > 0 and @ j@j > 0
show that information rent is always positive and higher for a more talented CEO.
vPj = v¯j +  j shows that CEO compensation can be decomposed into two parts:
frictionless CEO wage v¯j and information rent  j. A positive information rent implies
CEO compensation is higher in frictional CEO labor market than that in frictionless
CEO labor market. This is because in our model, under optimal contract, paying
a CEO higher wage implies a lower probability of monitoring, and since monitoring
is costly, the board thus tends to overpay the CEO to reduce total monitoring cost.
The result here is interesting at least for two reasons. First, it contributes to CEO
compensation literature by showing that information rent incorporated into match-
ing market can better explain why CEO compensation is so high. Second, traditional
CEO compensation literature either attributes CEO wage to efficient contracting OR
rent extraction. Our result here combines two explanations to show CEO compensa-
tion is determined both from efficient contracting (the frictionless CEO wage) AND
rent extraction (information rent).
vPj
@j  v¯j@j =  j@j > 0 shows that under frictional CEO labor market, due to information
friction, not only CEO wage is higher, but CEO wage increases faster as CEO rank
increases, which is a result of a more talented CEO extracting higher information
rent. There are two reasons for this. The first is, any information rent extracted by
lower talent CEOs will be at least partially captured by higher talent CEOs, by noting
that a lower talent CEO’s compensation is a higher talent CEO’s outside option. The
second is, under PAM, a higher talent CEO matches with a larger firm, and in a
larger firm, monitoring cost is even higher because of higher probability of monitor
(again from optimal contract), thus board at a larger firm has even higher incentive
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to overpay the CEO, which pushes information rent even higher for a more talented
CEO.
3.2 Monitoring CEOs
How board of directors monitor the CEO is an important component of corporate
governance, which can be defined as a system to prevent management from mak-
ing decisions that benefit themselves but are detrimental to shareholders and other
stakeholders. In this section, we interpret probability of monitoring as corporate gov-
ernance. We acknowledge that corporate governance is a multi-dimensional measure
(Zingales, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 1998), and our model
only attempts to capture one very specific aspect of corporate governance, which is
how intensely boards monitor CEOs. Besides, our interpretation is also similar to
Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012).
Boards of directors are always criticized by regulators, shareholders and the public
that they fail to monitor the CEO and serve their fiduciary role as a watchdog for
shareholders. A widely accepted view is that boards of directors are reluctant to
monitor CEOs due to CEOs’ managerial power and influence. As Kieff and Paredes
(2013) put it, “reluctance of monitoring boards to cross their CEOs is legendary”.
In this section, we provide an alternative explanation to why corporate governance
might be weak from the view of optimal contract. To state the proposition, we denote
the density functions for firm size and CEO talent as f(s) and t(a).
Proposition 6. Given sorting pattern M , for firm i,
i. When M 0(i) > 0, @gi@i < (>)0 if and only if t(aM(i)) is small (large) enough
compared with f(si)
ii. When M 0(i) < 0, @gi@i > 0 regardless of firm size and CEO talent distribution.
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The above proposition shows that both sorting pattern and distributions of firm
size and CEO talent can affect corporate governance. By noting that density function
measures scarcity and smaller density indicates a higher level of scarcity, (i.) shows
a seemingly striking result: larger firms can have weaker corporate governance than
smaller firms, despite of the fact that corporate governance might be more important
at a large firm because of more stakes on table. The central message here is that
board of directors will not impose a strong corporate governance when CEO talent
is sufficiently scarce. We emphasize here that what matters is relative scarcity: the
scarcity of CEO talent vs the scarcity of large firms.
The intuition for (i.) is as follows. Larger firms tend to have higher corporate
governance because higher probability of monitoring is needed at larger firms to pre-
vent CEOs from misreporting. On the other hand, larger firms match with higher
talent CEOs under PAM, and because higher talent CEOs are paid with a higher
compensation (Proposition 4) in equilibrium, it implies that larger firms tend to have
lower corporate governance. When talent is sufficiently scarce, CEO compensation
will be sufficiently high due to equilibrium force and the effect from compensation to
lower governance outweighs the effect from size to increase governance, and corporate
governance decreases with firm size. Here we provide an example to illustrate the
relation between corporate governance and scarcity.
Example 1. Assume k  ps0a02(1 p) , thus PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern and
M
0
(i) > 0, 8i 2 [0, 1]. According to Lemma 2, under PAM, corporate governance at
firm i is gi = 1 
´ j
0 '(l,j,k,PAM)sla
0
ldl
siai
with '(l, j, k, PAM) = exp[  ´ jl
(1 p)k
psxa2x
a
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]/(1 
(1 p)k
pslal
). We consider two extreme scenarios.
First, CEO talent is scarce: all firms have the same size s and CEOs have dif-
ferent talent. It’s easy to show that '(l, j, k, PAM) = 1
1  (1 p)kpsaj
. And thus corporate
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governance at firm i is gi = 1   1 
a0
ai
1  (1 p)kpsai
. Simple algebra shows that gi is decreasing
in ai.5 Thus corporate governance will be weaker for a firm matching with a more
talented CEO.
Second, CEO talent is in sufficient supply: all CEOs have the same talent a, and
all firms have different size. Proposition 4 implies CEOs with the same talent are
paid with the same wage, which is denoted as va, then gi = 1  vasia . Thus corporate
governance is increasing in firm size.
(ii.) shows that corporate governance increases in firm size when M 0(i) < 0
regardless of distributions of firm size and CEO talent. This is because whenM 0(i) <
0, larger firms match with lower talented CEOs. Because a lower talented CEO is
bounded to be paid with a lower wage according to Proposition 4, the board at a
larger firm will impose a stronger corporate governance to prevent the CEO from
misreporting, as now incentive compatibility is harder to satisfy with lower CEO
compensation.
Proposition 6 shows that firm-level corporate governance is a function of aggregate
market-level characteristics such as talent scarcity and sorting pattern. This explains
why empirical research on the relation between firm size and corporate governance
gives mixed results without controlling for the relative scarcity of CEO talent and
sorting pattern between CEOs and firms. For example, Klapper and Love (2004)
shows that firm size positively affect corporate governance and Black et al. (2006)
find a negative correlation between firm size and corporate governance index using
Korea data.
5Note that @gi@ai =
ps
(aips+k(p 1))2 (k (1  p)  a0ps) and by k 
ps0a0
2(1 p) , we have k (1  p)  a0ps 
ps0a0
2(1 p) (1  p)  a0ps < 0, thus @gi@ai < 0, 8i 2 [0, 1].
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3.3 Comparative Statics
We have examined how sorting pattern is related to marginal cost of monitoring
k and the probability of “high state” p, and it will also be interesting to see how
CEO compensation and corporate governance is affected by k and p. However, it’s
difficulty to fully pin down the comparative statics result because changing k and
p might simultaneously change sorting pattern, CEO compensation and corporate
governance. One special case is when k and p satisfy k  ps0a02(1 p) , from Proposition
2, we know PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern. Thus when k changes in the
region of [0, ps0a02(1 p) ], sorting pattern will be the same and it gives us an opportunity
to see how CEO compensation and corporate governance will be affected while fixing
equilibrium sorting pattern as PAM. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 7. When {k, p} 2 {k, p|0  k  ps0a02(1 p)}
i. Information rent for each CEO will be higher as k increases,
ii. Corporate governance at each firm will be weaker as p decreases or k increases
Thus a higher k will generate a higher information rent, which is easy to under-
stand because a larger k means monitoring is more costly, thus the board will tend
to overpay the CEO and reduce corporate governance to save monitoring cost. Thus
information rent is higher (and also CEO compensation) and corporate governance is
lower when k is larger. How p affects CEO compensation and corporate governance is
different from k. Note that a larger p will affect CEO compensation from two aspects,
first, the CEO will get paid better because marginal product is higher, second, it will
be paid worse because a larger p is similar to a smaller k which means the board will
prefer a lower compensation and higher corporate governance. However, the effect
from higher marginal product will be cancelled out in setting corporate governance
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and thus it’s easy to see corporate governance will be stronger as p increases, or in
other words, corporate governance will be weaker as p decreases.
4 EXTENSIONS
A salient feature of our model is that all boards have the same marginal cost of
monitoring. As we discussed in previous section, the reason for such assumption is
because of technical difficulties in dealing with multi-dimensional types if firms are
heterogenous in both size and marginal monitoring cost and our central focus on how
level instead of heterogeneity of such cost will affect sorting pattern. Nevertheless,
for completeness, we discuss two special cases when firms have different marginal
monitoring cost.
4.1 Two by Two Case
The setup here is similar to Subsection 2.2.1 discussing the equilibrium sorting
condition with two firms and two CEOs except now we assume the two firms have
different marginal costs of monitoring. Firm 0 and firm 1’s marginal costs of mon-
itoring are k     and k +   respectively, with    k. Note that we don’t rule out
  < 0. When   > 0, firm 1 has higher marginal cost of monitoring than firm 0 and
vice versa when   < 0. Similarly as in Subsection 2.2.1, we can solve the equilibrium
sorting condition: there is PAM between firm size and CEO talent if and only if
k  p
(1  p)
⇣
1
a1s1
+ 1a1s0
⌘ +   s21 + s20
s21   s20
Note here k is the average marginal cost of monitoring which measures the “level”
and   measures “heterogeneity” of marginal cost. It’s clear from the above inequal-
ity that both level and heterogeneity of marginal cost are important in determining
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sorting pattern. The similarity here with Subsection 2.2.1 (when both firms have the
same marginal cost) is, a higher k will push the market from PAM to NAM while
holding   the same, as long as   is not too large, even a non-zero   implies hetero-
geneity between marginal cost. While holding k fixed, a larger   will always push
sorting towards PAM. Note that as   increases, large firm has larger marginal cost
and smaller firm has smaller marginal cost. Next we discuss a special case when
marginal cost is increasing in firm size and firms have different firm size.
4.2 Size-dependent Marginal Cost
We assume here monitoring cost is ks✓g, ✓ 2 [0, 1], and thus marginal cost of moni-
toring is ks✓, which is obviously size-dependent. To understand such size dependence,
we can consider that conditional on auditing, CEO’s report is more complicated at a
larger firm, thus the board needs to exert more effort in verifying its authenticity.
By applying similar steps as in solving Subsection 2.1’s single firm problem, we
can solve the optimal contract, which is exactly the same as in Subsection 2.1. This
is not surprising because we have shown that optimal contract can be fully pinned
down by CEO’s incentive constraints, and the only change here is the cost function.
The board’s utility function is:
u(s, a, v) = psa  (1  p)ks✓   [1  (1  p)ks
✓ 1
pa
]v (6)
which can be used to solve equilibrium sorting pattern. The proof is essentially the
same as the proof for Proposition 2, which is presented in Appendix A. We can show
that there is positive assortative matching between firm size and CEO talent if and
only if k  ps1 ✓0 a0(1 p)(2 ✓) .
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Note that boards’ participation constraint requires k < ps
1 ✓
0 a0
(1 p) . If ✓ 6= 1 and
k 2 ( ps1 ✓0 a0(1 p)(2 ✓) , ps
1 ✓
0 a0
(1 p) ), PAM fails. When ✓ = 1, (
ps1 ✓0 a0
(1 p)(2 ✓) ,
ps1 ✓0 a0
(1 p) ) is empty, and
in fact, PAM is always the equilibrium sorting pattern irrespective of the value of k.
This shows that our result on the failure of PAM applies to a large scope of questions.
5 IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
5.1 Implications
CEO turnover. Empirical research shows that CEO turnover is strongly tied to
economic shock. However, according to relative performance evaluation literature,
market-level shock should be filtered out in the decision of retaining and firing CEOs.
By discussing how sorting pattern is related to p, our result can explain the seemingly
puzzling empirical findings. Notice that p measures the probability of “high output”,
then a decrease in p can be considered as a negative industry shock and an increase in
p can be considered as a positive industry shock. We have discussed that a decrease
in p causes PAM to fail and as p continues to decrease, PAM will fail for more and
more bottom firms and CEOs. We can consider a change in sorting pattern as CEO
turnover, thus our result shows that negative industry shock causes CEO turnover in
the following direction: worse CEOs get hired by larger firms and better CEOs work
for smaller firms.
Robustness of PAM. A set of papers using PAM as the basis for empirical applica-
tions has generated fruitful results(e.g., Tervio, 2008; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Pan,
2010; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013). PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern in a fric-
tionless CEO market with complementary production technology. However, when we
consider a more realistic setting in which CEOs have superior information and mon-
itoring CEOs is costly, PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern only when marginal
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cost of monitoring is below certain threshold according to Proposition 2. Thus PAM
is not a “take-as-given” result, it can not be assumed or implied even with comple-
mentary production technology. Proposition 3 thus provides a robustness check, by
showing that when PAM fails, it can still exist as the equilibrium sorting pattern for
larger firms and more talented CEOs. This implies that empirical applications rely-
ing on PAM are more robust with a sample of large firms (e.g., Gabaix and Landier
(2008) use S&P 500 data).
5.2 Empirical Predictions
From Proposition 1, CEO’s expected wage is pw1 = (1 g)sa and thus 1 g is the
dollar change in the CEO’s wage associated with one dollar change in firm revenue,
which is CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity, as defined in Jensen and Murphy (1990).
We can also note that as g decreases, the CEO’s expected wage increases. This implies
corporate governance and incentive contract are substitutes and CEO ownership can
reverse the negative impact of weak governance (Lilienfeld-Toal, 2014). Thus we have
the following prediction about the relation between CEO’s pay-performance sensitiv-
ity and CEO compensation with corporate governance, which has been supported by
the empirical evidence from Fahlenbrach (2009).
1. Pay-performance sensitivity and CEO compensation decrease with corporate gov-
ernance.
Another interesting and important empirical question is, is there PAM in CEO
labor market? If a number of empirical applications reply on PAM, then, it’s at least
necessary to understand if we can truly observe PAM in data. A more interesting way
to address this is, how the existence of PAM is connected to various explanatory vari-
ables? Proposition 2 connects sorting pattern to marginal cost of monitoring, which
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can be proxied by board characteristics. As we discussed in Section 2.1, board of
directors suffers from disutility because of their lack of independence, and in fact, it’s
not hard to show that this cost is also decreasing in board ownership and reputational
concerns.6 Thus we can connect sorting pattern to board independence, ownership
and reputational concerns. Cremers and Grinstein (2013) show that CEO labor mar-
ket is likely to be fragmented across different industries, thus the fragmentation of
CEO labor market provides us an opportunity for cross-industry tests. Proposition
2 also predicts PAM is more likely to fail under negative industry shock, which has
been discussed in Section 2.2.2 and in the discussion of CEO turnover. Proposition
3 shows that PAM fails for smaller firms and lower talent CEOs first. We thus have
the following empirical predictions on sorting pattern:
2. PAM between firm size and CEO talent is more likely to fail
(i.) for an industry with lower board independence, board ownership or reputa-
tional concerns,
(ii.) in economic downturn,
(iii.) for smaller firms and lower talent CEOs.
The first thing to notice here is that testing PAM is equivalent to testing a mono-
tonic relationship between firm size and CEO talent, which does not imply or is im-
plied by a positive correlation. Therefore, instead of using correlation between firm
size and CEO talent, we should use rank coefficient (e.g., Spearman’s ⇢ or Kendall’s ⌧)
as the empirical measure of PAM. In order to construct the rank coefficient, we need
data on firm size and CEO talent. Empirical literature uses market capitalization,
6Assume board has utility function u = ↵(q  w)  cg, with ↵ increases with board’s stock own-
ership and reputational concerns and c increases with board’s lack of independence. Here board
independence can be considered as percentage of independent directors among all directors. Inde-
pendent directors are board members who do not have any obvious relationship with the firm or its
senior executives that potentially would give rise to a conflict of interest. A simple monotone trans-
formation yields u = q   w   k with k = c↵ . Thus k is higher when board has lower independence,
ownership or reputational concerns.
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assets, or sales to measure firm size. The difficulty in this test is the unobservable
nature of CEO talent. To measure CEO talent, we can use CEO’s educational at-
tainment (Cole and Mehran, 2010), media coverage, age of first job as CEO, and
undergraduate school ranking (Falato et al., 2012, 2013). However, testing result
would be questionable if we are not sure how much it is affected by the measurement
errors in constructing proxy measures for talent.
Proposition 4 shows that CEO compensation is always an increasing function
of CEO talent regardless of whether PAM is true, this implies that there is higher
strength of monotonicity between CEO compensation and CEO talent than between
CEO compensation and firm size. As we discussed before, the strength of monotonic-
ity can be tested by rank coefficient. Define v
P
j
@j as wage spread between different
CEOs, then Proposition 5 states that wage spread will be higher for higher talent
CEOs. Under PAM, higher talent CEOs match with larger firms, thus wage spread
increases with firm size under PAM. Comparative statics result from Proposition 7
shows that CEO compensation increases with marginal cost of monitoring because
information rent is higher, and we have shown that marginal cost of monitoring is
decreasing in board independence, board ownership and board reputational concerns.
We thus have the following empirical predictions on CEO compensation:
3. i. Monotonicity between CEO compensation and CEO talent is stronger than that
between CEO compensation and firm size
ii. Under PAM, wage spread increases with firm size
iii. Under PAM, CEO compensation is higher for an industry with lower boards’
independence, boards’ ownership or reputational concerns
A board with higher ownership can be a board with more bockholders as directors.
Core et al. (1999) find that when a firm has an independent director who owns at least
5% of the shares, CEO compensation will be lower. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show
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that firms with independent blockholder directors have lower CEO compensation.
Becker et al. (2011), Cyert et al. (2002), and Bebchuk et al. (2010) have similar
findings. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) document that board independence is
associated with a reduction in CEO compensation.
According to Proposition 6, under PAM, when CEO talent becomes sufficiently
scarce, corporate governance can decrease in firm size. One thing to notice is that
we are dealing with relative scarcity here: when there are very few high talent CEOs
compared with large firms, we call there is a scarcity of CEO talent. Of course, the
opposite can happen: when there is a scarcity of large firms, larger firms will have
stronger corporate governance than smaller firms. Proposition 7 shows that when p
is smaller, corporate governance is weaker, thus corporate governance is weaker in
economic downturn. We state our predictions on corporate governance as follows:
4. Under PAM
i. When there is a scarcity of CEO talent (large firms), larger firms have weaker
(stronger) corporate governance than smaller firms
ii. Corporate governance is weaker at economic downturns
6 CONCLUSION
This paper models a CEO labor market where boards of directors make decisions
on which CEO to hire, how much to pay the CEO and how often to monitor the
CEO. CEOs have private information about firm production and can appropriate
firm resources by misreporting firm output. Boards of directors monitor CEOs with a
cost, which is affected by board independence, ownership and reputational concerns.
We have three novel findings on allocation of CEO talent, CEO compensation
and corporate governance. First, positive assortative matching between firm size and
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CEO talent can fail when marginal cost of monitoring is large enough or profitability
of firm production is low enough, which explains why CEO turnover is connected with
industry shock. A more important result is once PAM fails, it will fail first for smaller
firms and lower talent CEOs, which implies empirical applications relying on PAM are
more robust when using a subsample of large firms. Second, CEO compensation can
be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent, thus
CEO compensation in our model is higher than that solved from frictionless CEO
labor market, which helps explain why CEO compensation is so high. Third, firm-
level corporate governance is affected by aggregate market characteristics such as the
scarcity of CEO talent and sorting pattern. Larger firms can have weaker corporate
governance than smaller firms when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. This is in sharp
contrast with the traditional view which attributes weak corporate governance solely
to board of directors’ failure to monitor the CEO.
In this paper, we assume marginal cost of monitoring CEO is the same to all boards
in the CEO labor market, which is a fairly restrictive assumption. We show that
assuming this provides us tractability in analyzing complicated matching problem and
answering important questions on how the level of marginal monitoring cost (instead
of the difference in marginal monitoring cost among firms) would affect allocating,
compensating and monitoring CEOs. However, it’s a promising direction to consider
a market where boards of directors in different firms have different characteristics
and examine the effects of both the level and heterogeneity of board characteristics
among firms on the allocation of CEO talent. However, a general and comprehensive
approach requires solving multi-dimensional matching problem, which isn’t an easy
task, we thus only provide a rudimentary analysis on this matter in the extension by
considering two special cases.
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A PROOFS
Proof to Proposition 2
Proof. First, we prove that vj   v0, 8j 2 [0, 1], where vj is CEO j’s compensation and
v0 is CEO 0’s compensation. Assume there exists a CEO j
0
> 0 such that vj0 < v0.
Then the matching cannot be stable because the firm initially matching with CEO 0
will choose to match with CEO j 0 by paying CEO j 0 a wage of v0. The firm will be
better off because @u(s,a,v)@a > 0 implies the board will get a strictly higher utility by
shifting to CEO j 0 and CEO j 0 will be better off because of a higher wage.
We use the sufficient and necessary condition for PAM from Chade et al. (2014),
which states that PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern if and only if usvua usauv  
0, 8s, a, v. usv is the cross-partial of the board’s utility function (2) on s and v.
ua, usa, uv can be similarly defined. Simple algebra yields the sufficient and necessary
condition as
 2(1  p)k
p
pa 1s 1 + p+
(1  p)k
p
s 2a 2v   0, 8s, a, v
Because we have v   v0, 8v, the above inequality is equivalent to
 2(1  p)k
p
pa 1s 1 + p+
(1  p)k
p
s 2a 2v0   0, 8s, a
which is equivalent to sa
2  v0psa
p
1 p   k, 8s, a. Because s   s0, a   a0, 8s, a, we have
s0a0
2  v0ps0a0
p
1 p   k. When v0 = 0 , the sufficient and necessary condition for PAM is
k  s0a0
2
p
1  p
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Proof to Proposition 3
We first prove a lemma to show the necessary condition for NAM among any two
pairs of firms and CEOs.
Lemma 3. There is NAM for firms i > j and CEOs x > y only if k   p(1 p) 11
sjax
+ 1siax
  vypsiaxsjay
,
where vy is CEO y’s compensation.
Proof. Stability under NAM requires
psjay   [1  (1  p)k
psjay
]vy  psjax   [1  (1  p)k
psjax
]vx
psiax   [1  (1  p)k
psiax
]vx  psiay   [1  (1  p)k
psiay
]vy
The above inequalities imply
psiax   psiay + [1  (1 p)kpsiay ]vy
1  (1 p)kpsiax
 vx 
psjax   psjay + [1  (1 p)kpsjay ]vy
1  (1 p)kpsjax
which solves the necessary condition for NAM
k   p
(1  p)
1
1
sjax
+ 1siax  
vy
psiaxsjay
Next we use the above lemma to prove our proposition.
Proof. We prove the proposition in two steps, first we prove any firm or CEO in [¯i, 1]
will not match with any firm or CEO in [0, i¯]. We prove it by contradiction. We
assume there exists a firm i 2 [¯i, 1] and CEO y 2 [0, i¯] such that firm i matches with
CEO y. Because we have the same measure of firms and CEOs on [¯i, 1] and all firms
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and CEOs will be matched, then there must exist a firm j 2 [0, i¯] and a CEO x 2 [¯i, 1]
such that x and j match with each other. Because i > j and x > y, we thus have
NAM here. Because i > i¯ > j and x > i¯ > y, we have ax > ai¯ and si > sj > s0, thus
2
s0ai¯
> 1s0ax +
1
siax
> 1sjax +
1
siax
. And by i¯ = {i : k = ps0ai2(1 p)},
k =
p
2
s0ai¯
(1  p)
<
p
(1  p)
1
1
sjax
+ 1siax
<
p
(1  p)
1
1
sjax
+ 1siax  
vy
psiaxsjay
which violates condition for NAM according to Lemma 3.
Second step, we prove there is PAM on [¯i, 1]. We use the sufficient condition for
PAM from Chade et al. (2014), which states that if usvua   usauv   0, 8s, a, v, then
PAM is the equilibrium sorting pattern. usv is the cross-partial of the director’s utility
function (2) on s and v. ua, usa, uv can be similarly defined. Simple algebra yields
the sufficient condition:8s, a, v on [¯i, 1]
 2(1  p)k
p
pa 1s 1 + p+
(1  p)k
p
s 2a 2v   0
Because s   si¯ and a   ai¯ and v   0 for firms and CEOs on [¯i, 1], the above inequality
can be satisfied if
 2(1  p)k
p
pai¯
 1s 1i¯ + p   0
Substitute k = ps0ai¯2(1 p) to the above inequality, we have  2 (1 p)kp pai¯ 1s 1i¯ + p = p(1 
s0
si¯
)   0.
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Proof to Lemma 1
Proof. We can first prove that once PAM fails, there exists a firm x such thatM 0(x) <
0. This can be proved by contradiction. If there doesn’t exist such an x, then
M
0
(x) > 0 on [0, 1], which is exactly PAM. Because M is continuously differentiable,
there must exist a neighborhood of x, i.e., there exists a   > 0 such that M 0(x) <
0, i 2 (x   , x+  ). Denote a = x    and b = x+  , thus when PAM fails on [0, 1],
we can find a subset of firms (a, b) such that NAM will be the equilibrium sorting
pattern.
Proof to Lemma 2
Proof. We denote CEO j’s equilibrium wage as vj under matching M . Then board
at firm i’s utility if she hires CEO j is
u(si, aj, vj) = psiaj   (1  p)k   [1  (1  p)k
psiaj
]vj
For sorting patternM , CEO j matches with firmM(j). Because CEO j is the optimal
choice for the board at firmM(j), the following first order condition must be satisfied:
@u(si, aj, vj)
@j
|i=M(j) = psM(j)a0j   [1 
(1  p)k
psM(j)aj
]v
0
j  
(1  p)k
psM(j)aj2
a
0
jvj = 0
The solution to the above differential equation is vj =
´ j
0 '(l, j, k,M)psM(l)a
0
ldl, where
'(l, j, k,M) = exp[  ´ jl
(1 p)k
psM(x)a
2
x
a
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsM(x)ax
dx]/(1  (1 p)kpsM(l)al )
Proof to Proposition 4
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Proof. The first order condition as shown in the proof of Lemma 2 is
@u(si, aj, vj)
@j
|i=M(j) = psM(j)a0j   [1 
(1  p)k
psM(j)aj
]v
0
j  
(1  p)k
psM(j)aj2
a
0
jvj = 0
which solves v0j = [psM(j)aj   (1 p)kpsM(j)aj vj]
a
0
ja
 1
j
1  (1 p)kpsM(j)aj
. And we have psM(j)aj   vj and
(1 p)k
psM(j)aj
< 0, thus when a0j > 0,we have
vj
@j > 0. And when a
0
j = 0, we have
vj
@j = 0.
Proof to Proposition 5
Proof. We only need to prove  j   0 and @ j@j > 0. First, to prove  j   0, we prove
'(l, j, k, PAM)   1. Note that we have
'(l, j, k, PAM)
exp[
´ j
l
(1 p)k
ps2xax
s0x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]
=
1
1  (1 p)kpslal
exp[ 
ˆ j
l
(1 p)k
psxa2x
a
0
x +
(1 p)k
ps2xax
s
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]
=
1
1  (1 p)kpslal
exp[ 
ˆ j
l
d(1  (1 p)kpsxax )
1  (1 p)kpsxax
] =
1
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
Obviously exp[
´ j
l
(1 p)k
ps2xax
s
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]   1 and 1
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
  1, thus
'(l, j, k, PAM) = exp[
ˆ j
l
(1 p)k
ps2xax
s
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]
1
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
  1
It’s easy to see '(l, j, k, PAM) = 1 if and only if exp[
´ j
l
(1 p)k
ps2xax
s
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx] = 1 and 1
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
=
1, which is true if and only if k = 0. Thus  j ⌘
´ j
0 ['(l, j, PAM)  1]psla
0
ldl   0 and
 j = 0 if and only if k = 0.
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To prove @ j@j > 0, notice that we have '(l, j, k, PAM) =
exp[  ´ jl
(1 p)k
psxa2x
a
0
x
1  (1 p)kpsxax
dx]
1  (1 p)kpslal
, thus
@'(l,j,k,PAM)
@j =  
(1 p)k
psja
2
j
a
0
j
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
'(l, j, k, PAM). Then the partial derivative of  j with respect
to j is
@ j
@j
=
ˆ j
0
@'(l, j, k, PAM)
@j
psla
0
ldl + (
1
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
  1)psja0j
= ( 
(1 p)k
psja2j
a
0
j
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
)
ˆ j
0
'(l, j, k, PAM)psla
0
ldl + (
(1 p)k
psjaj
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
)psja
0
j
=
(1 p)k
psja2j
a
0
j
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
(psjaj   vj) =
(1 p)k
psja2j
a
0
j
1  (1 p)kpsjaj
⇡j > 0
And thus @ j@j > 0.
Proof to Proposition 6
Proof. Under matching M , CEO M(i) matches with firm i, and by the first order
condition derived in Section 3, we have v0M(i) = [psiaM(i)   (1 p)kpsiaM(i) vM(i)]
a
0
M(i)a
 1
M(i)
1  (1 p)kpsiaM(i)
.
Note that gi = 1  vM(i)psiaM(i) , we have
@gi
@i =  
v
0
M(i)M
0
(i)psiaM(i) p
⇣
s
0
iaM(i)+sja
0
M(i)M
0
(i)
⌘
vM(i)
(psiaM(i))
2 ,
and substitute v0M(i) into
@gi
@i , we have
@gi
@i =
Ais
0
i Bia
0
M(i)M
0
(i)
(psiaM(i))2
with Ai = paM(i)vM(i) and
Bi = [
psiaM(i) vM(i)
1  (1 p)kpsiaM(i)
]psi. It’s easy to see that Ai 2 [0, ps1a1] and Bi 2 [0, ps1a1
1  (1 p)kps0a0
ps1],
where [a0, a1] and [s0, s1] are supports for talent and size distributions respectively.
Thus both Ai and Bi are bounded functions of i on [0, 1] for sorting pattern M .
Denote F (.), T (.) as the distribution functions and f(.) and t(.) as the density
functions for firm size and CEO talent. Then the size of firm i is si = F 1(i), thus
s
0
i =
1
F 0 (si)
= 1f(si) . Similarly, a
0
M(i) =
1
t(aM(i))
. Therefore, we have
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@gi
@i
=
Ai
f(si)
  BiM
0
(i)
t(aM(i))
(psiaM(i))2
When M 0(i) < 0, it’s easy to see that @gi@i > 0. When M
0
(i) > 0, if f(si) is sufficiently
close to zero and t(aM(i)) is sufficiently large, then @gi@i > 0; if f(si) is sufficiently large
and t(aM(i)) is close to zero or M
0
(i) is sufficiently large , then @gi@i < 0.
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